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Dividing the Surplus: Will Globalization Give Women
a Larger or Smaller Share of the Benefits of
Cooperative Production?
KENNETH G. DAU-SCHMIDT"
INTRODUCTION
Professor Sassen argues that we need a new analytics to understand
gendering in today's global economy.' She maintains this position not because
gendering or the valorization and devalorization of different roles associated
with gender has not occurred before, but because the process that is underway
now--as local economies lurch and grind to mesh with the emerging global
economy--is different in both character and magnitude with what has been
observed before.2 I have no doubt that this is true. However, in my comment
for this symposium, I would like to focus first on what is similar between the
problems of women in the local or national economy and the global economy.
I will do this by analyzing the problems that women face whenever they
participate in production in cooperation with men, whether it be in economic
or social relationships. I will also briefly discuss the role of law in solving
these problems. Finally, once I have established the basic problems of women
engaging in production with men, I will examine the new implications or
problems that are added to this process by the phenomenon of globalization.
I. THE PROBLEM OF COOPERATIVE PRODUCTION
* Professor of Law and Charles L. Whistler Fellow, Indiana University School of Law,
Bloomington. J.D., University of Michigan, 1981; Ph.D. in Economics, University of Michigan, 1984. 1
would like to thank Professor David Fidler for useful discussions contributing to this Comment and Nicole
Daniel for her able research assistance.
1. Saskia Sassen, Towards a New Analytics to Understand Gendering in Today's Global Economy,
4 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 7, 9 (1996).
2. Id. Professor Sassen argues that the current discussion of globalization in the academic literature
is too focused on the "first" labor market of high-paid, high-tech information jobs while ignoring the
"second" labor market of low paid supply and manufacturing jobs which accompanies and supports the first
labor market. The gendering effect of globalization is to valorize the high paying, high-tech information
jobs populated mostly by men over the low paying supply jobs and manufacturing jobs populated mostly
by women.
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Much of human endeavor can be thought of as a problem of cooperative
production? People control various resources including land, steel, water,
wood, money, strength, skills, and intelligence that can be made more valuable
through combination with the resources of others. Not only economic
relationships can be thought of in this way. If one takes account of non-
pecuniary benefits, one can also think of social relationships, love, and
marriage in this way.4 Of course, combining efforts and resources with other
people is not always simple. Two fundamental problems arise in the
coordination of efforts.
The first problem that arises in cooperative production is that the parties
have to decide how best to use their combined resources. Garrett Hardin
addressed this problem in his classic article, The Tragedy of the Commons?
In that article Professor Hardin posited the cooperative production problem of
a village with a common pasture and several villagers each of whom own
sheep. Hardin argued that, absent some restraint, the villagers would take
account of only the personal benefits of grazing additional sheep and not the
common costs of depreciation of the meadow. The result would be that the
villagers would graze too many sheep and destroy the commons and the value
of their joint production.6 Although an extreme example, Hardin's parable
does demonstrate the importance of maintaining some mechanism for
coordinating cooperative production. The law can be used to solve this
problem either by enforcing some collective decision on joint production,
perhaps by specifying how many sheep each villager can raise, or by
specifying individual entitlements and enforcing negotiated solutions between
the parties regarding joint production, for example dividing the commons into
private tracts of land that individual villagers can use or let out as they see fit.
The second problem that can arise in cooperative production is
determining how to divide whatever surplus results from the endeavor. For
example, if grazing 100 sheep in Hardin's commons results in 150 sheep next
year, who gets to keep the fifty extra sheep? Unlike the previous problem of
coordinating joint production to maximize surplus, the problem of dividing the
surplus is a zero-sum game in which a benefit to one party necessarily comes
3. EDMUND S. PHELPS, POLITICAL ECONOMY: AN INTRODUCTORY TEXT 85-111(1985).
4. Carol M. Rose, Women and Property: Gaining and Losing Ground, 78 VA. L. REv. 421, 431
(1992).
5. See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 S0. 1243 (1968) (presenting
economic analysis).
6. Id. at 1244.
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at the expense of another party.7 The law can also be used to solve this
problem either by enforcing a collective decision on the division of the
surplus, or by enforcing private property rights and private agreements
concerning the division of any surplus. Even when the latter solution of
private property, bargaining, and markets is used to divide the surplus, the law
is sometimes employed as a means to rule out some of the harshest possible
outcomes of this atomistic process.' For example, the law might prohibit child
labor or discrimination on the basis of race or sex.
The economy, whether at a local, national, or global level, can be thought
of as a problem of cooperative production. At any of these levels, there are
many resources that can be productively employed in joint production to
people's benefit: natural resources, capital, and labor. Moreover, since I am
discussing the benefits of cooperative enterprise generally, there is no reason
why we must limit our consideration to only pecuniary relationships and
surplus. As previously mentioned,9 people's beneficial social relationships can
also be thought of as joint production processes. In short, vast potential
surplus exists in the economic and social relationships among people at the
local, national, and global levels. As exemplified in Hardin's sheep parable,
the problem lies in deciding how best to use these resources, and how best to
divide whatever surplus results.
H. THE PROBLEMS OF WOMEN IN THE DIVISION OF THE COOPERATIVE
SURPLUS
In general, women have never fared as well as men in the problem of
dividing the cooperative surplus from economic or social relationships. In
1980 the United Nations estimated that although women did two-thirds of the
world's work, they earned only one-tenth of the world's income and owned
only one-hundredth of the world's property."° Although the exact proportions
of the economic inequity suffered by women varies from country to country,
the basic pattern of more work and less remuneration seems stable across the
7. Rose, supra note 4, at 428.
8. See Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, II J. LEGAL STuD. 1, 19(1982).
9. See generally Rose, supra note 4 (analyzing the benefits and disadvantages of cooperative
property interests).
10. Emily MacFarquhar et al., The War Against Women, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 28,1994,
at 42, 42. See generally Shelly Wright, Women and the Global Economic Order: A Feminist Perspective,
10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 861 (1995) (discussing women's work in the informal or hidden economy
that goes unmeasured by conventional economic analysis).
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planet." Although harder to quantify, it seems fair to assert that women often
contribute more to social relationships with men and enjoy less of the surplus
from these relationships. Worldwide, women do the majority of work in
maintaining the household and rearing children, 2 yet are more likely than men
to be caught in a physically abusive or exploitive relationship. 3 The basic
reasons why women fare so poorly in the division of the cooperative surplus
with men are that, in all possible means of exchange, women suffer
disadvantages due to their physical differences from men as well as cultural
and religious beliefs about the appropriate roles of women.
First, there is the possibility of physical coercion in exchange and thus in
the division of the cooperative surplus. Although economists commonly
assume that exchanges are voluntary and therefore mutually beneficial, this
would seem a naive assumption with respect to dealings between some men
and women. The relevance of coerced exchanges to the problems of women
is evidenced by a partial listing of the topics of concern at the recent
International Women's Rights Conference held in Toronto: female infanticide,
forced marriage, dowry murder, domestic violence, sexual slavery, and rape."
Women are generally at a physical disadvantage in coercive dealings with
men. Moreover, cultural norms sometimes sanction violence against women
under the rubric of the family order and female obedience.'5
Second, even when women are not physically coerced in their joint
production efforts with men, they are often at a disadvantage in bargaining for
the surplus from their cooperative endeavors. Women's direct physical ties to
their offspring leave them with high needs and low alternatives through much
of their adult lives-a very poor bargaining position. Certain cultural norms or
practices such as female subservience, the woman as homemaker, and
polygamy can further act to undermine women's bargaining power. 6 It is
11. MacFarquhar et al., supra note 10, at 44.
12. Wright, supra note 10, at 867-68.
13. Rose, supra note 4, at 443. See Elizabeth Evatt, Ours By Right: Women's Rights as Human
Rights, 7 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 295, 296 (1994) (book review).
14. See generally OURS BY RIGHT: WOMEN'S RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS (Joanna Derr ed., 1993)
(a collection of essays presented at the Toronto conference). For an essay reviewing some of the general
themes of the Toronto conference, see generally Evatt, supra note 13, at 296. See also Organization of
American States: Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence
Against Women, 33 1.L.M. 1534 (1994); MacFarquhar et al., supra note 10, at 45.
15. Evatt, supra note 13, at 296-97.
16. Id.
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difficult to effectively bargain with one's "master" either as an employee or as
a wife.
Finally, as Professor Carol Rose has argued, because women are more
cooperative than men, or at least perceived to be more cooperative than men,
women will generally do worse than men in the division of the benefits of their
joint endeavors because men will have a more credible threat to leave the
cooperative venture. 7 Women will suffer in bargaining because of their
cooperative nature, real or perceived, despite the fact that society as a whole
will benefit from the increase in joint productive endeavors women's
cooperation makes possible.
Markets may sometimes limit the extent to which women can be exploited
in bargaining by providing them with alternatives. If an employer or customer
attempts to take advantage of a woman's poor bargaining position in
negotiating the terms of an exchange, the woman may take her productive
resources elsewhere. However, markets are not perfect and have themselves
proven subject to cultural biases and discrimination. Women may suffer lower
wages in the labor market because biases against female education and in favor
of female child rearing lower women's productivity in the paid labor market, 8
and because cultural roles shunt women into lower paid professions. 9
Moreover, even putting differences in productivity and occupational choice
aside, empirical studies demonstrate that women are consistently paid less than
men for the same work. °
The law might be used to gain women a greater share of the cooperative
surplus from economic and social relationships. It is fundamental to the
efficient and equitable undertaking of cooperative production, under either a
collective or atomistic system, that all people be secure from violation of their
bodily integrity and free from physical coercion in their business and social
dealings.2' Effective laws protecting women from rape, murder, and physical
17. Rose, supra note 4, at 430.
18. ROBERT H. FRANK, MICROECONOMCS AND BEHAVIOR 503 (1991).
19. See generally Barbara Bergman, The Economics of Women's Liberation, CHALLENGE, May-June
1973, at 12 (arguing that the most imprtant manifestation of employer prejudice is the desire to restrict
women to spheres which are viewed as proper for them).
20. Glen G. Cain, The Economic Analysis of Labor Market Discrimination: A Survey, in 1
HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 693, 750-51 (Orley C. Ashenfelter & Richard Layard eds., 1986)
(surveying a variety of studies to show that women's wages as a percent of men's vary from 40% to 93%
even after adjusting for differences in productivity and profession).
21. Richard Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1193, 1195-96
(1985).
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coercion are a prerequisite to any well-ordered society. In addition, the law
could be used to ameliorate or redress some of women's disadvantages in
bargaining and the market. For example, laws requiring men to bear (at least)
financial responsibility for their offspring would help alleviate the pressure of
needs on women in bargaining. Moreover, government programs promoting
female education in all fields, combined with guarantees of equal rights for
women and prohibitions on sex discrimination would help provide alternatives
for women in bargaining and redress market imperfections. Not surprisingly,
such government initiatives have been a goal of feminists not only at the local
level, but also in national and international arenas.'
III. THE EFFECT OF GLOBALIZATION ON WOMEN AND THEIR PROBLEMS
IN GAINING A SHARE OF THE COOPERATIVE SURPLUS
What are the effects of globalization of the economy on this problem?
Will globalization help or hurt women in their efforts to gain a greater share
of the cooperative surplus from economic and social relationships? Perhaps
not surprisingly for any such phenomenon that is so multi-faceted and
pervasive, I believe the effect of globalization on women Will be both positive
and negative.
On the positive side, globalization of the economy will provide women
with more opportunities, limiting the extent to which they can be exploited in
bargaining. This is no panacea. As I have previously discussed, markets are
also subject to discrimination against women. Indeed, as Professor Sassen's
work demonstrates, the pattern of shunting women into low paid positions and
occupations that has been historically evident in local and national economies
is also evident in the globalized sectors of the economy. ' The jobs for women
in the globalized sector also seem of limited use in terms of providing women
with opportunities during their high need child-rearing years since there seems
to be a decided preference on the part of employers for young women without
children.2' Nevertheless, employers in global export industries decidedly
22. Evatt, supra note 13, at 297. See MacFarquhar et al., supra note 10, at 44; Aihwa Ong, Strategic
Sisterhood or Sisters in Solidarity?: Questions of Communitarianism and Citizenship in Asia, 4 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 107(1996).
23. SASKIA SAssEN, THE MOBiLrrY OF LABOR AND CAPrrAL 113-14 (1988); Sassen, supra note 1,
at 14.
24. SASsEN, supra note 23, at 113.
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prefer female employees,25 and to the extent that these jobs provide
opportunities and skills previously unavailable to women in these industries,
they should improve women's bargaining position with respect to their
traditional economic and social relationships.
A second aspect of globalization that will have both positive and negative
implications for women is the breakdown of local culture and customs. In part
this breakdown occurs as a result of local economies' efforts to adapt to and
accommodate the global economy, and in part it occurs due to people's
exposure to other cultures. 6 The export of American television and films has
literally provided a world stage for American culture. As previously
discussed, some cultural norms such as male-only education, female
obedience, and the woman as homemaker undermine women's bargaining
power and serve as the basis for discrimination against women. To the extent
that globalization lessens these cultural norms it will provide women with
greater opportunities and improve women's bargaining position vis-a-vis men.
However, some cultural norms, for example the extended family, can protect
women when they are vulnerable and in their dealings with men. To the extent
that globalization breaks down cultural norms that are protective of vulnerable
women and meet women's needs, women will of course suffer.
Finally, as Professor Sassen has pointed out, globalization of the economy
and the recent move towards privatization have tended to undermine the role
of the nation-state in governing the affairs of people." Globalized sectors of
the economy still need a physical base of operations and local support services,
and this foundation provides a modest opportunity for national regulation."
However, the recent advances in communication and transportation and the
hyper-mobility of capital leave some industries just beyond the reach of
effective national regulation. If a nation enacts regulation that the officers of
a mobile industry do not like, or even if they do like it but it puts them at a
competitive disadvantage, the nation stands to lose that industry to another
nation without similar regulation. This is not good news for women since, as
discussed previously, one role of government in managing the process of
25. Id.
26. Id. at 97.
27. Sassen, supra note 1, at 17; Saskia Sassen, When the State Encounters a New Space Economy:
The Case of Information Industries, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y, 769, 774 (1995). See also Zillah
Eisenstein, Stop Stomping on the Rest of Us: Retrieving Publicness from the Privatization of the Globe, 4
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 59 (1996).
28. Saskia Sassen, supra note 1, at 14.
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cooperative production is to ameliorate the harshest outcomes of the process
such as exploitation and discrimination. To the extent that regulations
protecting women from exploitation and discrimination place international
businesses at a competitive disadvantage, women will no longer be able to
seek effective redress through national regulation. Accordingly, enforceable
international conventions against exploitation and sex discrimination, like
those proposed at the recent U.N. women's conference in Beijing, 9 become
even more important to the future fortunes of women in the global economy.
If the nation-state cannot be counted on to independently perform its role of
protecting vulnerable members of its society from exploitation and
discrimination, then effective international conventions must be developed to
encourage States to perform this role.
CONCLUSION
Whether the process of globalization of the economy will improve or
erode the lot of women in economic and social cooperative production is yet
to be seen. Globalization may have some beneficial effects for women by
providing them with new opportunities and skills that will improve women's
productivity and bargaining position relative to men. Globalization may also
break down some of the cultural norms that hold women back, although other
cultural norms that aid women may also be lost. State initiatives to educate
women and prohibit their exploitation and discriminatory exclusion from job
opportunities will also be important in redressing women's historic
disadvantages in exchanges with men. As globalization of the economy
undermines the ability of nation-states to effectively govern international
business concerns and undertake such initiatives, effective international
conventions to encourage States to undertake such initiatives must be
developed. Accordingly, with the globalization of the economy, feminists
must seek solutions to women's problems not only on the local and national
levels, but on the international level as well.
29. Eisenstein, supra note 27, at 92.
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